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Introduction and summary
Over the last decade, the Japanese banking system has
experienced a sizable deterioration in its financial con-
dition. Commercial banks have recorded cumulative
loan losses of about ¥83 trillion (16.5 percent of 2002
Japanese gross domestic product or $690 billion) since
1992. Some ¥32 trillion of loans were deemed non-
collectible and written off in full (see Kashyap, 2002).
These losses significantly reduced the banks’ cap-
italization and led to the failure of three large banking
firms.1 On November 17, 1997, Japanese regulators
failed and liquidated a large “city” bank for the first
time since the end of World War II and on October
23, 1998, and December 14, 1998, they nationalized
two of the three very large long-term credit banks.2
Coming amidst a general economic malaise and a
severe banking crisis, these failures might be expected
to have had significant implications for the rest of the
Japanese economy. In Japan banks play a much more
important role in the economy than in the U.S. In 1990,
just before the collapse of the Japanese banking system,
banks funded 19.4 percent of a nonfinancial firm’s
assets, and total claims of the deposit-taking banks on
the private sector equaled 1.6 times nominal gross
domestic product (GDP). In contrast, in the U.S. in
1990, bank loans funded less than 6 percent of the to-
tal assets of a U.S. firm, and commercial bank claims
on the private sector were less than one-half of nomi-
nal GDP. The Japanese banks also have close ties to
their business customers. They are not only a major
source of funds to these firms, but also, in contrast to
the United States, often own equity in them and are in-
volved in their management, particularly when a firm
is in financial distress.
There is a large literature, both theoretical and em-
pirical, that suggests that strong banking relationships
are valuable to bank clients because they enable client
firms to obtain funds that would otherwise not be
available to them in the public markets. In efficient
capital markets, the stock prices of bank clients would
reflect this positive contribution. However, financial
distress at banks can raise questions about the future
viability of such valuable relationships. Because it is
costly for firms to replace their existing banks and estab-
lish new relationships, the announcement of a bank
failure should negatively impact the stock prices of firms
that have lending relationships with the failed bank.
The announcement of the three failures might also
have had spillover effects for surviving banks and
their clients. The failures revealed that the losses at
these institutions were much higher than previously
reported publicly and marked an apparent significant
shift in the attitude of Japanese regulators toward bank-
ing problems. Japanese regulators, who had been wide-
ly criticized outside Japan for their reluctance to let
financial institutions fail legally, were imposing more
rigorous standards on financial institutions and expos-
ing shareholders and possibly uninsured creditors to
losses for the first time since World War II. Thus, each
failure announcement might have created a negative
perception of the industry as a whole and thus had spill-
over effects beyond the failed banks. That is, the an-
nouncements could have raised questions about the
long-term viability of surviving banks and the relation-
ships maintained by them, particularly if the banks were
financially weak and adversely affected by the announce-
ments. If so, the failure announcements could also
have adversely affected the stock prices of firms that
were clients of surviving banks.
In this article, we summarize the results of our ear-
lier research in Brewer, Genay, Hunter, and Kaufman
(2003a and 2003b) on what the failure announcements3 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
of important Japanese banks signaled both for other
banks and for firms that received credit from the failed
or surviving banks. In particular, we focus on the fol-
lowing questions. What was the impact of the three
failure announcements on the market value of surviving
banks? Are these effects related to the characteristics
of the individual surviving banks? How does the sev-
erance or modification of banking relationships due
to bank failure announcements affect the market value
of the bank’s borrowers? Are the effects related to the
characteristics of the individual borrowers, such as
their financial condition or potential access to bank
credit and capital markets? Are there spillover effects
to other banks and borrowers at these banks, particular-
ly when the failures occur during a financial crisis?
Like previous studies for both the United States and
other countries, we find that the failures were perceived
to be bad news for other banks as a whole and worse
news for banks in a weaker financial condition. On aver-
age, the excess returns for the surviving banks, com-
puted around each of the three failure announcement
dates, were negative and significantly different from
zero. The negative effects were greater for surviving
banks with weaker financial conditions and greater loan
exposures to the more risky sectors of the economy
(for example, the real estate, construction, and finance
and insurance sectors). Thus, the three failure announce-
ments had a significant adverse effect on surviving
banks as a whole. The next question is whether these
announcements affected firms that received loans
from either the failed or surviving banks.
We find that the market valuations of customers
of the failed banks were adversely affected at the date
of the failure announcements. In addition, the effects
were related to the financial characteristics of the firms
and their primary bank. The adverse impact was more
severe for nonfinancial firms that valued their existing
banking relationships more or borrowed from a bank
in weaker financial condition. However, these effects
were not significantly different from the effects expe-
rienced by all firms in the economy. That is, the three
bank failures represented “bad news” for all firms in
the economy, not only for the customers of the failed
banks. But one should be cautious about generalizing
these results to other countries. Our analysis focuses
on an economy that is heavily bank-dependent and was
in the midst of an extended financial crisis. Neverthe-
less, to the extent that these results for Japan may be
representative, they raise questions regarding the im-
pact of bank failures not only on their own clients, but
on the rest of the economy.
Because the potential impact of the bank failure
announcements on bank clients depends on the value
of their banking relationships, in the next section we
briefly review the theoretical and empirical literature
on the value of banking relationships. We then present
some information about the three banks that failed and
discuss the potential impact of the failure announcements
on the share prices of other banks and bank clients. In
the following two sections, we describe our methodol-
ogy and data and summarize our results with respect
to the impact of the three failures on other banks, clients
of the failed banks, and all bank clients.
Banking relationships
Theoretical considerations
The relationships that banks have with their custom-
ers play an important role in moving funds from savers
to borrowers. Petersen and Rajan (1994, p. 5) define a
banking relationship to be the “close and continued in-
teraction” between a bank and a firm that “may provide
a lender with sufficient information about, and a voice
in, the firm’s affairs.” These interactions can occur
through providing deposit services to savers, credit
services to borrowers, or both. Standard money and
banking textbooks indicate that a bank facilitates the
movement of funds from savers to borrowers by buy-
ing financial claims with one set of characteristics from
borrowers (for example, loans) and then selling its own
liabilities with a different set of characteristics to savers
(for example, deposits). Such financial intermediation
or transformation services may involve maturity in-
termediation (financing assets with longer maturity
than the institution’s liabilities); denomination inter-
mediation (holding assets with different unit size than
the liabilities); liquidity intermediation (funding illiq-
uid loans with liquid liabilities); and/or credit risk in-
termediation (holding assets with greater default risk
than the institution’s liabilities). As a bank provides
some or all these services to its customers through time,
it gains substantial knowledge about their financial
condition and needs. The bank can use this knowledge
to stimulate both borrowing and saving. While borrow-
ers can gain access to savers’ funds directly without
the intermediation efforts of a bank, financial interme-
diation theory suggests that this direct channel often
is less efficient and could result in financial contracts
that do not allocate funds optimally and may even fail
to fund some socially desirable activities (Berlin, 1987).
One problem faced by a saver lending funds di-
rectly to a commercial firm is the high cost of informa-
tion collection. Before funds are lent, savers must
collect, process, and interpret firm-specific information
to distinguish between good firms with high expected
profits and low risk and bad firms with low expected
profits and high risk. Thus, by screening carefully the4 3Q/2003, Economic Perspectives
pool of borrowers, savers can reduce the chances that
a loan might be made to a high credit risk at too low
an interest rate. However, screening can evolve trans-
action costs that are large relative to a household’s
savings, making it less profitable to fund some firms.
In addition, savers are frequently unable to determine
the quality of potential borrowers. These two obstacles
could create enough friction in the lending process that
savers may decide to make fewer loans or even not to
make any loans though there are good credit risks in
the marketplace. Even if a saver were able to overcome
transactions costs and the lack of specialized knowledge
to evaluate borrowers’ initial quality, he or she must
continuously monitor the actions of firms to ensure that
their owners/managers do not take actions with the
loan proceeds contrary to the condition specified in
the loan agreement. It is probably reasonable to assume
that the owners/managers of the firm know more than
savers about the firm’s projects and prospects. In such
an atmosphere of information asymmetry, there is no
assurance that the self-interested behavior of the firm
will conform to that expected by savers. As a result,
some profitable projects may not be funded because
of substantial uncertainty.
One solution to the information asymmetry prob-
lem is the introduction of a bank or similar financial
intermediary that interacts with both savers and borrow-
ers through time. Ongoing interaction between banks
and their clients through time and across products pro-
vides banks with an opportunity to gather valuable, often
confidential, information about their clients, through
both lending and deposit services (Fama, 1985).3
For example, on the lending side, this information
is obtained when banks provide screening (Allen, 1990;
Ramakrishnan and Thakor, 1984) and monitoring ser-
vices (Diamond, 1984; Winton, 1995). Screening activi-
ty involves collecting and interpreting borrower-specific,
often proprietary information to help the bank assess
a firm’s true risk before the loan is made. A firm is more
likely to reveal proprietary information to its bank
than to financial market participants in general be-
cause it does not have to worry about whether the in-
formation disclosed would spill over to competitors
as it likely would if it was disseminated to all financial
market participants. Once banks have screened the
pool of available borrowers, they know firms’ credit
quality and can charge them an interest rate that re-
flects that quality.
After a loan is made, monitoring activities involve
keeping track of each firm’s financial condition by au-
diting the firm frequently, checking on what the manage-
ment is doing to ensure that they are performing under
the terms of the loan agreement, and taking action on
a timely basis to protect its investment if the firm is not
performing. When a firm encounters trouble making
an interest payment on time, a banker’s first response
is to take a closer look at the firm’s financial condition
to determine the source of this difficulty. If after a closer
inspection, the banker finds that the firm’s longer-run
prospects are good, the banker may offer to reschedule
the interest payments or relax some of the covenants,
in order to improve its chances of getting its funds back
in the future. Alternatively, the bank can terminate the
loan. Boot (2000) argues that the bank–borrower re-
lationship is typically less rigid than a capital market
funding arrangement because renegotiation of contract
terms is easier. Boot et al. (1993) also argue that the
greater flexibility that is offered by relationship bank-
ing can improve aggregate welfare because discretion
has value. As with screening activities, monitoring
activities provide a bank with an opportunity to gather
borrower-specific information beyond that readily
available from public sources.
On the deposit side, the information gained from
offering checking and other deposit account services
may help the bank assess a customer’s repayment capa-
bility, allowing the bank to make and structure its loans
based on the customer’s deposit history. Kane and
Malkiel (1965) argue that an incumbent bank has an
information advantage over competitors by privately ob-
serving how its customers manage their deposit accounts.
Deposit accounts can provide early warning of deteri-
oration in borrowers’ cash flows. By monitoring the
total amount of checks clearing through the bank, the
banker can gauge a client firm’s revenues relatively
accurately without waiting for quarterly reports from
accountants. Fama (1985) points out that the proprietary
knowledge of a customer that a bank gains through de-
posit services makes the bank unique relative to other
financial institutions. Customer-specific information
obtained from deposit activities may make it possible
for a bank to offer its depositors loan terms that are
more favorable than those offered to nondepositors.
The financial intermediation literature concludes
that banking relationships provide an opportunity for
more informative credit-contracting decisions based
on a better exchange of information, and also increase
the availability and/or reduce the price of credit to firms
whose projects and prospects are difficult to evaluate
by outside investors.4 Thus, they create value.
Empirical evidence on the benefits
of banking relationships
If, as suggested by the literature on financial inter-
mediation, banks are better informed about their clients
than investors in capital markets, then announcements
of new or renewed bank lending arrangements should5 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
provide new and useful information to financial market
participants and increase security prices of affected
firms. James (1987) examines whether the market value
of a firm’s stock is affected by a bank’s announcement
of a loan to that firm, and how the effect of a bank loan
announcement differs from the effects of announcements
of changes in other financing arrangements, such as new
issues of bonds. He finds that a bank loan announcement
has a positive effect on stock prices, in sharp contrast to
the negative or zero effects on stock prices associated
with other announcements of new capital market fund-
ing. Lummer and McConnell (1989) divide bank loan
announcements into new bank loans and bank loan
renewals. They find that only announcements of bank
loan renewals had a positive effect on stock prices.
Billett, Flannery, and Garfinkel (1995) examine
the relationship between lender quality and loan-an-
nouncement-day stock price reactions. If banks certify
the creditworthiness of their client firms, then bank quali-
ty should be of importance in determining the credibility
of the certification. The researchers find a statistically
significant positive stock price reaction for borrowing
firms to loan announcements from high-quality banks
and a negative, though statistically insignificant, re-
action to loan announcements from low-quality banks.
If banking relationships are valuable, as suggested
by these papers, then in efficient capital markets, the
stock prices of bank clients would reflect the current
and future expected value of these relationships. Hence,
if an event raises questions about the ability of a bank
to sustain its relationships in the future and it is costly
to replace that existing banking relationship, one would
expect the event to have a negative impact on the share
prices of the clients of the bank.
Following this logic, Slovin, Sushka, and Polonchek
(1993) examine the stock price reactions of the loan
client firms of the Continental Illinois National Bank
(Chicago) in its period of economic insolvency and res-
cue by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC) in 1984. They find that firms with known lend-
ing relationships with Continental Illinois sustained sig-
nificantly negative excess returns during the banking
firm’s financial difficulties, but positive returns in re-
sponse to the announcement of support by the FDIC.
But, because the positive excess returns over the bailout
event window were smaller than the negative excess
returns over the period immediately before the bailout,
on average borrowing firms suffered significant negative
excess returns from Continental’s financial distress.
A number of studies have extended the Slovin,
Sushka, and Polonchek (1993) analysis to the failure
of banks outside of the United States. Yamori and
Murakami (1999) examine how the failure of a
Japanese bank (Hokkaido Takushoku Bank) affected
the stock prices of client firms. They find that firms
that listed the failed bank as their most important bank
experienced the largest negative stock market reaction
in response to the bank’s failure announcement. Djankov,
Jindra, and Klapper (2001) examine the stock market
valuation effect on client firms of the insolvency of
31 banking organizations in East Asia. They report
that insolvency announcements that precede the liq-
uidation of banks, and thus the loss of the borrowers’
banking connection, lead to a significant negative stock
market reaction. On the other hand, announcements
that a bank would be nationalized and recapitalized with
a new management team—events that keep the bank
in operation and thus do not necessarily sever existing
banking relationships and can potentially improve the
financial condition of the bank—are associated with
positive excess returns.
Bae, Kang, and Lim (2002) examine the durability
of banking relationships in Korea during that country’s
financial crisis in the late 1990s. They find that bank
financial distress was associated with negative excess
returns for client firms, and the announcement effects
were greater for the bank-dependent and financially
weak client firms of the weakest banks. This suggests
that a combination of bank and firm characteristics
determines the interpretation and the impact of bad news
about a bank on its customers. Ongena, Smith, and
Michalsen (2003) examine the impact of bank distress
announcements in Norway on client firms. The authors
find that the impact of these announcements on bank
client firms was small and temporary, and did not differ
statistically from the impact on nonclient firms. The
authors also find that more liquid firms had higher ex-
cess returns. The overall conclusion of these empirical
studies is that stockholders of publicly traded firms view
relationships between firms and banks as valuable.5
Three Japanese bank failures
We examine the stock market response to three
important Japanese bank failures in 1997 and 1998:
Hokkaido Takushoku Bank on November 17, 1997,
the Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan (LTCB) on
October 23, 1998, and the Nippon Credit Bank
(NCB) on December 13, 1998.
Hokkaido Takushoku Bank (November 17, 1997)
Hokkaido Takushoku Bank was the smallest so-
called “city” bank, but one of the largest 20 commer-
cial banks in Japan, with more than ¥9.5 trillion in
assets. On November 17, 1997, the bank announced
that due to its difficulties in raising funds, it would close
and transfer its regional operations in the Hokkaido
region in northern Japan to the North Pacific Bank.6 3Q/2003, Economic Perspectives
Its operations outside of Hokkaido were eventually
sold to Chuo Trust and Banking Co. The bank’s bad
loans were sold to the government Deposit Insurance
Corporation (DIC), and the Bank of Japan extended
emergency loans to the bank during the transition
period to provide liquidity to meet deposit outflows.
The problems of the bank were well known, and its
closure followed an aborted government-sanctioned
merger attempt with the nearby Hokkaido Bank.6
Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan
(October 23, 1998)
Long-Term Credit Bank (LTCB) was one of the
largest banks in Japan and was widely perceived to be
in serious financial trouble prior to its failure. Despite
an injection of capital from the government in March
1998, its debt was downgraded several times and its
share price dropped sharply. A merger attempt with
Sumitomo Trust Bank, a large bank in a stronger fi-
nancial condition, failed in the summer of 1998. On
October 19, 1998, news reports indicated that the new-
ly established Financial Supervisory Agency (FSA)
had informed LTCB earlier in the day that the bank
was insolvent on a market-value basis as of the end
of September, when it was last inspected.7 The reports
also indicated that LTCB was expected to be nation-
alized later in the week, when recently adopted bank-
ing legislation would take effect.8 Four days later on
October 23, 1998, LTCB applied for nationalization.
The government announced that it would guarantee
all obligations of LTCB, the DIC would purchase the
bank’s shares (last traded at ¥2, down from ¥210 on
January 5, 1998), and the Bank of Japan would pro-
vide financial aid to LTCB as necessary to maintain
liquidity in financial markets. According to the FSA
report, at the end of September 1998, the bank had
total assets of ¥24 trillion and ¥160 billion in book-
value capital. It also reported ¥500 billion, or three
times its book-value capital, of unrealized losses on
its securities portfolio and other problem assets total-
ing ¥4.62 trillion, or 19 percent of its total assets and
roughly 30 times its capital.9
Nippon Credit Bank (December 14, 1998)
The semiannual public financial statements issued
by all Japanese banks on November 24, 1998, for the
six months ending September 30 showed that another
large long-term credit bank—the Nippon Credit Bank
(NCB), with assets of ¥7.7 trillion as of September
1998—had significant amounts of problem loans and
that its earnings had deteriorated significantly since March
1998. However, the bank stated that it was still solvent.
On December 9, 1998, it was announced that NCB
was abandoning its previously announced merger
with Chuo Trust and Banking Co. The abandoned
merger was perceived as a sign of further problems at
NCB. Shortly thereafter, news reports indicated that
the FSA’s examination of the bank showed that as
early as March 31, 1998, contrary to what NCB had
reported, the bank actually had a capital deficit of ¥94.4
billion and was insolvent. On December 12, the federal
government urged Nippon Credit to apply for nation-
alization, which it did on the next business day—
December 14. The government provided assurances
that the repayment of all of NCB’s obligations would
be satisfied in full and on time and that the Bank of
Japan would provide loans to ensure the liquidity of
the markets. The Bank injected some ¥80 billion into
NCB to avoid having it default on its liabilities.
Performance of the failed institutions prior
to failure
To understand the impact of these failures on other
banks and customers, it is necessary to examine the per-
formance and financial condition of the failed institu-
tions just prior to their failure. Figure 1, panels A–F
compare the financial condition and performance of
the three failed banks with surviving institutions using
data published in their last full-year financial statements.
The figures also report the rank of each failed institu-
tion relative to the rank of all banks in the sample for
each of the performance measures.
It is apparent that the failed banks had much lower
reported earnings and asset quality than the surviving
banks. For instance, only 29 of the 118 banks had lower
returns on assets than Hokkaido Takushoku Bank in the
three years prior to its failure. Similarly, LTCB and NCB
were in the bottom quartile of the sample in terms of
returns on assets. These banks did not fare better with
respect to asset quality. There were only three banks that
had higher nonperforming loans relative to capital than
Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, and LTCB and NCB had
the highest ratios of risky loans. The reported capital
ratios of the failed banks were close to the average ratios,
however. In retrospect, this reflected a dramatic under-
stating of losses from loans and other investments.
Impact of the failures on surviving banks
This evidence suggests that the failed banks were
publicly known to be in relatively poor health prior to
their failure. Hence, market participants could have rea-
sonably anticipated the three failures based on their re-
ported financial condition. If so, the announcements
should have had no measurable impact on the share pric-
es of other firms, including surviving banks, in the econ-
omy. However, there are several reasons for believing
that a failure announcement could affect the market
valuation of surviving banks. A failure announcement7 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
FIGURE 1
Performance comparison of failed and surviving institutions
A.Return on assets
B.Loan loss reserves ratio
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1997 failure 1998 failure 1997 failure 1998 failure
1997 failure 1998 failure 1997 failure 1998 failure
*Rank/total in sample.
Notes: This figure presents a comparison of the performance of the three banks with the performance of their surviving peer groups. The financial
condition and performance of banks are measured by their profitability (return on equity and return on assets), their asset quality (loan loss
reserves/equity capital, nonperforming loans/equity capital, and risky loans/total domestic loans), equity capital/total assets, and size (total
assets). Risky loans are defined as loans to the real estate, finance, and construction sectors. The profitability measures are averaged over the
previous three years, whereas all the other measures are reported as of the last financial statement of the failed institution prior to its failure.
The measures for the surviving institutions are dated similarly.
Source: Authors’ calculations from data in Brewer, Genay, Hunter, and Kaufman (2003a).8 3Q/2003, Economic Perspectives
could be viewed as positive news for the industry as a
whole, generating positive excess returns for the surviv-
ing banks. This would occur if uncertainty regarding the
condition of the banking system or the regulators’ failure
to resolve insolvencies before the failure imposed costs
on surviving banks. Thus, the resolution of the uncertainty
or a stronger regulatory posture removes these costs. A
positive reaction to a failure announcement could also
occur if the resolution of insolvencies implied that the
financially stronger banks in Japan would no longer be
called upon by the regulators to assist the weaker institu-
tions, as they had been in the past. Lastly, the exit of
weak firms may also improve the competitive conditions
for surviving banks, increasing their earnings and share
prices (Lang and Stulz, 1992; and Kaufman, 1994).
Alternatively, a failure announcement could have
a significant negative impact on the share prices of sur-
viving banks by signaling higher operating and regulato-
ry costs. A failure might reveal previously undisclosed
or understated problems in the banking system. In ad-
dition, banks that were perceived to be similarly insol-
vent could be seen as the next victims of the regulatory
failure resolution process, or could face increased sur-
veillance and various regulatory actions to restrict their
activities (Grammatikos and Saunders, 1990).
It is also possible that a failure announcement could
affect all surviving bank stocks similarly, regardless of
differences in the financial condition or other charac-
teristics of the individual banks. The ability of the mar-
ket to differentiate among banks is affected by the
quality and timeliness of the information that is publicly
disclosed. The less accurate, precise, or timely the in-
formation, the less likely are security prices to fully
reflect the actual financial and risk characteristics of
the individual banks. In such an environment, even if
the failures revealed new information and had a signif-
icant impact on the banking sector as a whole, their
impact on individual bank share prices would not be
correlated with the reported condition of the banks.
In contrast, if accurate and timely information were
available, investors could assess the relevance of the
failure announcements to the operation of individual
banks. The responses of shareholders would then be
related to financial and other characteristics of the sur-
viving banks. For example, if the failures increased the
likelihood that regulators would allow weak institutions
to fail without relying on financial support from stronger
banks or revealed previously undisclosed problems in
certain sectors of the economy, one would expect banks
in weaker financial condition or with greater exposure
to the problem institutions to be more adversely affected.
Evidence in Brewer, Genay, Hunter, and Kaufman
(2003a) suggests that, despite the well-known problems
at these banks, their failures were not fully anticipated.
Figure 2 shows some of the key results from our earlier
research on the impact of the three failures on the stock
market valuations of surviving Japanese banks. The stock
market valuation effects are computed for each individu-
al surviving bank using a single factor market model as
discussed in box 1. In particular, daily bank stock returns
are correlated with a return index of the overall stock
market and a binary variable that is equal to one on or
around each failure announcement date and zero other-
wise. This model measures excess returns by the coeffi-
cients of the binary variable in each equation for the
individual banks. The mean excess returns for these banks
were negative around the failure announcement of each
of the three banks, although they were significant only
around the failure of Hokkaido Takushoku Bank.
Nevertheless, even if an announcement has a sig-
nificant impact on the individual surviving bank returns,
it is still possible to find that the mean excess returns
for all banks are not statistically different from zero if
the excess returns of individual surviving banks have
opposite signs and offset each other. Table 1 provides
several tests to determine whether the event parameter
of each bank jointly equals zero on a failure announce-
ment and whether the event parameter is equal across
all banks on a failure announcement. The first row of
the table reports the F-statistic test for the hypothesis
that the excess returns for each bank jointly equal
zero. We can reject this hypothesis for each of the
three failure announcements. This suggests that the
failure announcements had a significant negative im-
pact on most individual surviving bank stock returns,
FIGURE 2
Average excess returns of surviving banks
percent
Note: This figure presents the average excess returns of
surviving banks in the two-day window surrounding the three
failure announcements.
Source: Authors’ calculations from data in Brewer, Genay,
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as well as on all banks as a whole, and supports the
contention that the failure announcements were viewed
as “bad news” for surviving banks.
The second row of the table tests the hypothesis
that the impact of the announcements was equal across
all banks. This test allows rejection in two of the three
failures. Taken together, these results indicate that the
shareholder responses to the events varied across in-
dividual banks.
Moreover, the cross-sectional variation in the re-
sponses of individual surviving banks depended system-
atically on a bank’s financial condition. In particular,
surviving banks in weaker financial condition suffered
more negative excess returns than those in stronger fi-
nancial condition. Figure 3 summarizes the relationship
between excess returns of individual banks and a set
of variables that reflect their financial condition, as esti-
mated in Brewer, Genay, Hunter, and Kaufman (2003a).
In all three of the failures, excess returns of surviving
banks were inversely related to their ratio of loan loss
reserves to equity capital. In two of the failures, the ex-
cess returns of surviving banks were more negative for
banks with higher ratios of nonperforming loans to equi-
ty capital, although statistically significant for only one
of the failures. Similarly, surviving banks with greater
loan exposure to the riskier real estate, construction, and
finance and insurance sectors were more adversely
affected by all three failures and significantly so by one.
In all three failures, banks with larger equity cushions
suffered less from the failure announcements than other
banks, but again the differences were statistically sig-
nificant for only one failure.
Whether they were statistically significant or not,
the cross-sectional differences in the excess returns of
banks of different financial condition were economi-
cally large. For example, when Hokkaido Takushoku
Bank failed, banks with loan loss reserves in the lowest
one-tenth percentile had an estimated excess return
of –1.41 percent. Banks with loan loss reserves in the
highest one-tenth percentile, on the other hand, suffered
excess returns of –1.76 percent, about 25 percent larger.
The 35 basis point difference in the expected excess
returns is particularly large compared with the average
daily returns of –0.09 percent prior to the failure an-
nouncement. There were similarly strong, if not stronger,
results when we compared the variations in expected
excess returns arising from changes in the other financial
condition variables for the other failure announcements.
These results suggest that the failures were not fully
anticipated prior to the announcements, and the impact
of the announcements on the rest of the banking system
depended on the financial condition of individual banks.
The statistically significant negative coefficients for
the accounting variables are particularly interesting,
because it is widely argued that the accounting and regu-
latory distortions of these variables greatly understat-
ed and possibly concealed the true deterioration in the
financial condition of Japanese banks during this period.
The above results suggest that shareholders of Japanese
banks were, nevertheless, able to extract the informa-
tion contained in these accounting measures to assess
the relative impact of adverse news on individual banks.
Impact of the failures on bank clients
As noted earlier, a defining characteristic of all
three failures was that the magnitude of bad loans and
valuation losses previously disclosed by the failed in-
stitutions had been significantly understated. Thus, the
BOX 1
Event study procedure to compute
excess returns for surviving banks and clients
We estimate the stock price impact of each of the
failure announcements by employing standard event
study methodology and a Multivariate Regression
Model (MVRM), similar to that used by Binder
(1988), Karafiath, Mynatt, and Smith (1991),
Malatesta (1986), Millon-Cornett and Tehranian
(1990), and Schipper and Thompson (1983), among
others. In the MVRM model, excess returns are
obtained by adding a (0,1) binary variable to the
right-hand side of the traditional market model to
capture the impact of the announcement or “event”
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where Rit is the stock return of firm i on day t; αi
is the intercept coefficient for firm i; Rmt is the mar-
ket index for day t; βi is the market risk coefficient
for firm i; Dk is a binary dummy variable that equals
1 if day t is equal to the event window k, zero other-
wise; γik is the event coefficient for firm i; and εit
is a random error term, which is assumed to be in-
dependently identically distributed normal, inde-
pendent of the return on the market and the binary
variables. The estimated parameters γik capture any
daily intercept shifts in event window k and provide
an estimate of excess or unexpected returns asso-
ciated with the concurrent failure announcement
in window k. Since this interval in the event win-
dow is “dummied out,” the observations in the day
–1 to day +1 interval do not influence the estimate
of the intercept. Only those observations without
dummies determine the value of the intercept.10 3Q/2003, Economic Perspectives
banks had concealed the true extent of their problems.
The release of this new information might call into
question the continued availability of funds for their
client firms, especially for those experiencing financial
distress and/or those that use bank loans as a major
source of liquidity. In addition, because the regulators
had not failed major economically insolvent banks ear-
lier, the failures might also have signaled a regulato-
ry shift to increased probability of bank closures in
the future, particularly for the riskier banks (Brewer,
Genay, Hunter, and Kaufman, 2003a; Spiegel and
Yamori, 2000). In either case, if banking relationships
enhance the value of bank clients, we would expect
clients of the announcing banks, and possibly also
the surviving banks, to be adversely
affected by the failures.
The three failures also revealed a
significant change in the institutional and
government support structure of Japanese
financial institutions. Previously, weak
or troubled institutions could rely on
capital injections and loans from affiliat-
ed companies or on rescue mergers with
a stronger institution. However, two of
the three failed banks were not liquidated
but nationalized and kept in operation,
and most of the third bank was taken
over by two other banks. If these chang-
es cause the “new” banks to continue to
fund their loan customers with less fa-
vorable terms than the old banks, then
the stock market valuation effects should
be negative, as observed by Slovin,
Sushka, and Polonchek (1993) for the
Continental Bank. On the other hand, if
the financial markets perceive the nation-
alizations as an attempt by the Japanese
government to ensure that the client
firms have continued access to credit on
more or less the same basis, the stock market reactions
of clients of the failed banks should be positive.
Lastly, previous studies suggest that the value of
banking relationships is, among other factors, related to
the ability of client firms to access alternative sources
of funding, the degree of information asymmetry be-
tween firms and lenders, the future investment opportu-
nities of the firms, and the firms’ profitability. If the
Japanese bank failures changed the value of banking
relationships, we would expect the magnitude of the
impact of these failures to be correlated with firm charac-
teristics that affect the value of the relationships.
In particular, we would expect firms that are heavily
dependent on their existing banks and have few
FIGURE 3
Correlation between excess returns and
financial condition of surviving banks
percent
Notes: This figure presents the association between the stock market reaction
to each failure announcement and selected measures of banks’ financial
condition. The financial condition variables are the ratio of loan loss reserves
to total book value of equity (LLR); the ratio of nonperforming loans to total
book value of equity (NPL); the ratio of risky loans (defined as loans to real
estate, construction, and finance sectors) to total domestic loans (RISKY);
and the ratio of total book value of equity to total assets (CAPITAL).












LLR NPL RISKY CAPITAL
TABLE 1
Hypothesis tests of the excess returns
Hokkaido Takushoku LTCB NCB
bank failure nationalization nationalization
(11/17/97; N = 76) (10/19/98; N = 80) (12/14/98; N = 80)
Hypothesis test that the excess returns 5.88** 1.36* 1.30*
  jointly equal zero
Hypothesis test that the excess returns 5.80** 1.36* 1.26
  are equal across banks
** Significant at the 1 percent level.
* Significant at the 5 percent level.
Source: Authors’ calculations from data in Brewer, Genay, Hunter, and Kaufman (2003a).11 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
alternative sources of funding to be more adversely af-
fected by bank failure announcements. On the other
hand, firms that are clients of relatively healthy banks
should suffer less from these announcements. A relation-
ship with a bank in good financial condition is less likely
to be threatened by the failure of another bank; hence, for
firms whose primary bank is relatively healthy, the fail-
ure announcements should have a less adverse effect.
Methodology and data
We obtained the announcement dates of the three
failures through a search of the Wall Street Journal,
Reuters news wire, Newscast news service, and the
Knight Ridder business wire, which include news ar-
ticles from Japan and other international news sources.
If the failure announcement was made during a trading
day in Japan, that date is used as the event day. If an
announcement was made after the market was closed
or over the weekend, we use the next trading date as
the event date. For LTCB, we used the date of the first
news stories that cited official government sources that
the bank was in imminent danger of being nationalized.10
Our empirical analysis for measuring the impact
of bank failures on bank–client relationships is con-
ducted in two steps. First, we focus on the responses
of client firms to the three bank failures and compare
the responses of firms that were clients of the three failed
banks to the responses of a control set of nonclient firms.
The approach we used to generate the response of
firms’ equity returns to the announcements is similar
to that used for banks and is discussed in box 1.
Second, we examine whether the cross-sectional
variations in the stock market responses of the firms are
related to their financial characteristics, in particular
how much they valued their existing banking relation-
ships. Box 2 provides a description of the procedure
used to generate the correlations between excess re-
turns of individual firms and their characteristics.
We identify the clients of the three failed banks
from the Autumn 1997 and Autumn 1998 issues of
the quarterly Japan Company Handbook (JCH), which
lists the banks used by each company.11 Firms are iden-
tified as clients of a failed bank if the failed bank ap-
pears anywhere on the bank list, irrespective of its rank.
All other firms included in the University of Rhode
Island’s Pacific Basin Capital Markets Research Center
(PACAP) 1999 database are identified as clients of the
surviving banks and are grouped in the control sample.
We obtained daily stock prices and returns for
sample firms and the market index from the PACAP 1999
database for 1994 through 1997. The market returns are
measured by the TOPIX index, which includes seasoned
shares of over 1,000 major Japanese companies, both
banks and nonbanks (the First Section), traded on the
Tokyo Stock Exchange. We obtained data on the finan-
cial condition of these firms from the PACAP database.
Empirical results
Reactions of client firms to bank failure announcements
Do the bank failure announcements affect the stock
market valuation of banks’ client firms? In particular,
does the severance of banking relationships due to bank
failure affect the stock market valuation of the clients
of failed banks? Is there a similar, perhaps smaller, in-
direct effect on the clients of surviving banks? Are any
effects of bank failures on the market valuation of clients
of failed and surviving banks related to the character-
istics of firms that measure their financial strength,
BOX 2
Correlation between excess returns
and financial condition of clients of failed
and surviving banks
We use the following basic specification to ex-
amine the factors that are correlated with firms’
excess returns and variables capturing relation-
ship banking:
γi,[–1,+1] = α + φCONDi + δCLi + λ(CLi × CONDi)
+ Others + µi ,
where γi,[–1,+1] is the excess return of firm i over
the event window [–1, +1], CLt is a binary vari-
able that identifies the clients of the failed banks
and is equal to one if firm i is a client of the failed
bank, zero otherwise; CONDi is a vector of vari-
ables that describes the financial condition of firm i
and the financial condition of its primary bank at
the time of the event; and Others is a set of con-
trol variables. The interaction term (CL × COND)
is included to examine whether the excess returns
of clients of failed banks are more sensitive to firm
characteristics than the excess returns of the clients
of surviving banks. The client firm’s characteris-
tics that are in the vector COND include four alter-
native measures of the financial condition of firms:
the ratio of loans to total assets (LOANS/TA);
the ratio of book value of equity to total assets
(EQUITY/TA); the average return on assets over
the previous five years (ROA); and a measure of
liquidity—the ratio of cash and securities to total
assets. The primary bank’s characteristics that are
in the vector COND are capitalization ratio (bank’s
equity/total assets), the ratio of loan loss reserves
to total loans (bank’s loan loss reserves/total loans),
and return on assets averaged over the previous
five years (bank ROA).12 3Q/2003, Economic Perspectives
potential access to credit, and future investment op-
portunities? In the remainder of this article, we sum-
marize the results of our research on these questions
(from Brewer, Genay, Hunter, and Kaufman, 2003b).
Figure 4 provides estimates of excess returns for two
portfolios of bank customers—clients of one of the three
failed banks and clients of the surviving banks—at
the announcement dates of the three bank failures. Esti-
mates reported are the mean of the individual coeffi-
cients of each firm. Of the six (three announcements
times two sets of client firms) estimated mean excess
returns of the bank clients, five have the expected nega-
tive signs, and all five are statistically significant. Thus,
these results suggest that the stock market valuation of
the failed bank clients is adversely affected at the date of
the failure announcements. In addition, the figure shows
that the market valuations of surviving banks’ client
firms are also negatively affected at the date of the fail-
ure announcements. The evidence in figure 4 suggests
that the effects are not significantly different for clients of
failed banks and for clients of surviving banks. These re-
sults suggest that bank failures are bad news for all firms in
the economy, not just for clients of failed banks. In part,
however, this may be unique to Japan. In the observation
period, the whole banking sector in Japan was experienc-
ing financial distress. Japan is also a small country, so
shocks in the economy are likely to affect most if not
all banks. This makes it more likely that bank depen-
dence is costly for all Japanese firms, regardless of the
identity of their primary bank (Kang and Stulz, 2000).
One could argue that the reason we do not see a
significant difference in the stock price reactions of the
clients of the failed and surviving banks is that the three
failures were primarily signals of economy-wide bad
news, which dominated any news about the value of
relationships maintained by the failed banks. To ex-
plore this possibility, we grouped the firms in each
sample on the basis of their stock price sensitivity to
aggregate market movements (their market beta). We
then compared the impact of the events on the clients
of the failed and surviving banks, after adjusting for
the firms’ sensitivity to market- or economy-wide move-
ments. Figure 5 shows the excess returns of failed and
client firms, each grouped as low- and high-beta firms—
to each of the three failures. These results indicate that
the three failure announcements had a larger impact
on the firms with greater sensitivity to aggregate market
movements.12 This suggests that the announcements
affected bank clients with higher market risk more than
those with relatively low market risk. However, when
we compared the responses of failed and surviving
bank clients for each beta group, we still did not find
any statistical differences.13
Cross-section tests of relationship between firms’
financial characteristics and abnormal returns
Failure announcements need not have equal effects
on all bank client firms. Indeed, theory suggests that
the announcement effects should be related to the fi-
nancial and other characteristics of the firms.14 Brewer,
Genay, Hunter, and Kaufman (2003b) employ four
alternative measures to indicate a firm’s dependence
on banks for credit: the ratio of loans to total assets
(LOANS/TA); the ratio of book value of equity to total
assets (EQUITY/TA); the average return on assets over
the previous five years (ROA); and a measure of liquid-
ity—the ratio of cash and securities to total assets.
Figure 6 provides correlation estimates between
excess returns and each of our four measures that proxy
for the value of banking relationships. If bank failure
adversely affects valuable banking relationships, we
would expect variables positively correlated with in-
formation problems, and hence bank dependence, to
be negatively correlated with excess returns. Further-
more, we would expect the correlation to be stronger
for the clients of failed banks.
The results in figure 6 are broadly consistent with
the prediction that firms for which existing banking
relationships are more valuable suffer more at the an-
nouncement of the failure of their bank. Clients of
failed banks that had high loans relative to assets (that
is, more intermediated debt), lower return on assets,
or lower capitalization suffered significantly more
negative reactions to the failure announcements.
FIGURE 4
Average excess returns of clients of failed and
surviving banks
percent
Note: This figure presents the average excess returns for the
clients of the three failed banks and the control group in the
three-day period surrounding the three failure announcements
[–1, +1].
Source: Authors’ calculations from data in Brewer, Genay,










Clients of failed banks
Clients of surviving banks13 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Similarly, client firms of surviving
banks for which existing banking rela-
tionships are likely to be more valuable
experienced more negative excess returns
at the announcement date of the three bank
failures. In particular, firms that had high
loans relative to assets, lower returns on
assets, lower capitalization ratios, and
lower liquidity had significantly more
negative excess returns. These results are
consistent with the hypothesis that bank
failures threaten the viability of valuable
banking relationships for weaker firms at
all Japanese banks.
In addition, for firm profitability, we
can reject the equality of coefficients for
the clients of failed and surviving banks.
The correlation between excess returns and
return on assets of firms is stronger for the
clients of failed than surviving banks. How-
ever, for other firm characteristics, we can
not reject the equality of coefficients for
the clients of failed and surviving banks.
Hence, the results show little support for
the prediction that the relationship between
excess returns and financial characteristics
is stronger for the clients of failed banks.
We also correlate excess returns with
firm size and find a positive and significant
correlation for failed bank clients in all
models. This result is consistent with the
prediction that larger clients suffered less
from the failure of their banks. In addition,
we can reject the hypothesis that the cor-
relation between size and excess returns
for the clients of failed and surviving banks
is equal in all of these models. The mag-
nitudes of the coefficients on firm size for
the two groups indicate that the excess re-
turns of the failed-bank clients are two to
three times as large as those of the surviv-
ing-bank clients. If size proxies for access
to external funds, then these results suggest
that clients of failed banks that had greater
access to external financing experienced
less severe stock market reactions to the
failure announcements than the clients of
surviving banks with similar access.
Overall, the results in figure 6 support the hypoth-
esis that the excess returns of firms at the announcement
of the three bank failures are correlated with the char-
acteristics of the client firms. Moreover, the directions
of these correlations are consistent with our predictions.
percent
Notes: This figure presents the average excess returns for the clients of the
three failed banks and the control group in the three-day period surrounding
the three failure announcements [-1, +1]. The market sensitivity of firms (β)
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Average excess returns of clients of failed
and surviving banks, by market sensitivity
Correlation between excess returns and
financial condition of clients of failed and surviving banks
percent
Notes: This figure presents estimates of the correlation between excess returns
and selected measures of client firms’ financial condition. The financial condition
variables are: 1) firm’s bank dependence proxy, LOANS/TA—the ratio of bank loans
to total assets; 2) firm capitalization, EQUITY/TA—the ratio of book-value equity
to total assets; 3) firm profitability, ROA—the ratio of net income to total assets;
and 4) firm liquidity—the ratio of cash plus investment security to total assets.
*** Indicates statistical differences in the correlation estimates for failed and
surviving bank client firms at the 1 percent level.
Source: Authors’ calculations from data in Brewer, Genay, Hunter, and
Kaufman (2003b).











Figure 6 offers little evidence that the relationship be-
tween firm and bank characteristics and excess returns
is stronger for the clients of failed banks relative to the
clients of surviving banks. The three failures had more
severe adverse impacts on the valuations of all firms for14 3Q/2003, Economic Perspectives
which existing banking relationships were
more valuable, regardless of whether their
banks failed or survived.
We also relate the excess returns of
individual firms to the characteristics of
their primary bank. In general, we would
expect financially stronger banks to weather
a crisis better than weaker banks. Hence,
a bank failure or crisis is less likely to
threaten the viability of relationships main-
tained by healthy banks; and the clients
of financially stronger banks should suf-
fer less from bank failure announcements.
We measured the financial condition of a
bank by its size, capitalization, loan loss
ratios, profits, and estimated excess re-
turns at the failure announcements—the
excess returns summarized in figure 2.
The results of our analysis—summarized
in figure 7—indicate that, if the primary
bank of a firm had more capital, had few-
er loan losses, was more profitable, or
had a less adverse reaction to the failure announce-
ment, the firm suffered less from the announcements.
Conclusion
Prior to the mid-1990s, bank failures were rare
events in post-World War II Japan. Then on Novem-
ber 17, 1997, Japanese regulators failed a large “city”
bank for the first time since the end of World War II.
On October 23, 1998, and December 14, 1998, they
nationalized two of the three very large long-term credit
banks. In this article, we summarize the results of our
recent research on what these announcements meant for
both surviving banks and firms that rely on the failed
and surviving banks for credit and other banking ser-
vices. These failures were important events that signaled
information that could reasonably be expected to raise
questions about the long-term viability of surviving
banks and the banking relationships both failed and
surviving banks maintain with their client firms. The
results of our investigation are of particular interest
in light of the alleged lack of poor financial transpar-
ency in Japan, the uneven behavior of the regulators,
and the severity of the banking crisis in this period.
Like previous studies that use data from countries
with relatively better financial transparency, our re-
sults indicate that the three failures were perceived to
be bad news for surviving banks. On average, stock
prices for the surviving banks declined around each
of the announcement dates of the failures, and the
declines were greater for surviving banks with lower
capitalization and higher ratios of risky loans. This
FIGURE 7
Correlation between abnormal returns of bank clients and
financial condition of primary bank
percent
Source: Authors’ calculations from data in Brewer, Genay, Hunter, and
Kaufman (2003b).
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evidence suggests that despite the alleged lack of
transparency, stock market participants were able to
incorporate new information relatively quickly—and
by magnitudes and in directions that would be pre-
dicted by theory—and to differentiate among banks
on the basis of their relative risk characteristics. The
policy implication is that bank regulators in Japan can
use market monitoring and discipline more extensive-
ly to supplement regulatory discipline to promote a
safer and more efficient banking system.
These announcements also had spillover effects
for nonfinancial clients of both failed and surviving
banks. Stock market valuations of failed banks’ client
firms were adversely affected at the date of the failure
announcements. The adverse impact was more severe
for firms that valued their existing banking relation-
ships more or borrowed from a bank in weaker finan-
cial condition. We find, however, that these effects
were not significantly different from the effects expe-
rienced by all client firms in the economy. As it turns
out, the three bank failure announcements represented
“bad news” for all firms in the economy, not only for
the customers of the failed banks. But one should be
cautious about generalizing these results to other coun-
tries. Our analysis focuses on an economy that is heavily
bank-dependent and in the midst of an extended finan-
cial crisis. Nevertheless, to the extent that these results
for Japan may be representative, they raise questions
regarding the impact of bank failures not only on their
client firms, but also on the rest of the economy.15 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
NOTES
1Several smaller banks were also failed during this period. See
Spiegel and Yamori (2000) for a list of banks failed during the 1990s.
2Japanese banks are often classified into four types—city banks,
long-term credit banks, trust banks, and regional banks—according
to their size, composition of assets and loans, customer base, funding
sources, and regulatory requirements and treatment. See Genay
(1998) for a detailed discussion of the differences in their operations.
3For recent reviews of the literature on banking relationships, see
Boot (2000) and Ongena and Smith (2000a) and references therein.
4While we have emphasized their benefits, banking relationships
can also impose costs by generating perverse incentives for banks
in the enforcement of contracts, provision of follow-up financing,
and financing of high-risk projects with positive net present value.
Banking relationships can also give monopoly power to banks, im-
posing welfare costs. In addition, banking relationships can isolate
firms, their managers, and banks from market discipline and cor-
porate governance that would otherwise produce optimal business
decisions. For an excellent discussion of these costs, see Boot
(2000) and Ongena and Smith (2000a).
5Another group of studies examines the link between the strength
and the value-added aspects of bank–client relationships. Petersen
and Rajan (1994), Berger and Udell (1995), and Cole (1998) find
the value of banking relationships to be particularly important to
small businesses in the U.S.—which typically face greater infor-
mation problems than larger firms and have more limited access to
public capital markets. The duration of the banking relationship is
positively correlated with the availability of credit (Petersen and
Rajan, 1994; Berger and Udell, 1995). The contractual terms gen-
erally improve for the borrower over the life of the relationship—
interest rates and collateral requirements fall. Several papers present
evidence on the value and the nature of banking relationships in
other countries, where banks play a greater role in firms’ financing
than in the United States. Hall and Weinstein (2000), Hoshi,
Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1990 and 1991), Kaplan and Minton
(1994), Kang and Shivdasani (1995), Morck and Nakamura (1999),
Morck, Nakamura, and Shivdasani (2000), Peek and Rosengren
(2003), and Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) focus on banking relation-
ships in Japan. Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000), Detragiache et al.
(2000), Elsas and Krahnen (1998), Foglia et al. (1998), and Ongena
and Smith (2000b), examine banking relationships in Europe.
These studies report that banking relationships enhance firm value
by generating an exchange of information that facilitates finance,
providing corporate governance, enabling intertemporal smooth-
ing of loan prices, and providing liquidity insurance to borrowers
during periods of financial distress.
6News articles reported that depositors began to withdraw funds
from the bank after it was announced that the planned merger with
Hokkaido Bank would not happen. News reports also noted that
many of the large stakeholders, for example, the life insurance com-
panies, refused to inject additional funds into the bank’s capital
base in the weeks leading up to its closure. The bank’s share price,
which was ¥222 at the beginning of 1997, had dropped to ¥65 the
day before the failure announcement on November 17, 1997. The
day after the announcement, its share price declined to ¥5.
7The Financial Supervisory Agency, which assumed supervisory
responsibilities for financial institutions from the Ministry of
Finance, was established on June 22, 1998.
8A package of eight bills was approved by the parliament on
October 12, 1998, aimed at resolving the bad loans of Japanese
banks and dealing with the failure of financial institutions. The
legislation allowed for recapitalization of banks with public funds
and created the Financial Reconstruction Commission (FRC), to,
among other duties, administer nationalized insolvent institutions.
9After the nationalization, the good assets of the bank were even-
tually sold to a consortium led by U.S.-based Ripplewood Holdings
LLC, which paid ¥1 billion for the bank and injected an additional
¥120 billion in capital. The new bank was renamed Shinsei Bank
Ltd. and received ¥240 billion of public capital from the Financial
Reconstruction Commission in March 2000. According to a Wall
Street Journal article (Singer, 2003), for the fiscal year ended
March 31, Shinsei Bank posted its third straight year of profit.
10Consequently, the event dates for LTCB (October 19, 1998) and
NCB (December 14, 1998) differ from the announcement dates.
11This procedure was employed by Gibson (1995 and 1997) and
Yamori and Murakami (1999).
12The differences in the excess returns of high- and low-beta firms
were significant at the 1 percent level for the clients of surviving
banks in the Hokkaido Takushoku Bank failure and the clients of
both the failed and surviving banks in the LTCB failure.
13To determine the robustness of our results, we also conducted a
number of tests to determine if these results are dependent on
how we identify the clients of failed banks and whether our re-
sults could be explained by how firms and banks decide to form
relationships. The results of these tests, discussed in Brewer,
Genay, Hunter, and Kaufman (2003b), indicate that our main re-
sults carry through under these alternative assumptions.
14In Brewer, Genay, Hunter, and Kaufman (2003b), we also ex-
amined how the announcement effects correlated with the finan-
cial and other characteristics of the firms’ banks, as well as with
the financial and other characteristics of the client firms.16 3Q/2003, Economic Perspectives
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